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SAVINGTHEWTOFROMTHERISK
OF IRRELEVANCE: THEWTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENTMECHANISM
ASA ‘COMMONGOOD’ FORRTADISPUTES
Henry Gao* and C. L. Lim**
ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have prolif-
erated globally. Such proliferation of RTAs created a renewed sense of
urgency for the WTO to take action in order to avoid the fate of being
eclipsed into irrelevance. There are several options for coping with the chal-
lenge. Theoretically speaking, the best approach would be to heighten the
level of ambition in global trade talks to reduce all trade barriers to zero so
that the discriminatory effect created by RTAs could be reduced or even
eliminated. In reality, such an approach would be impossible for well-
known reasons. The next best option would be for the WTO to draft ‘best
practices’ or model RTAs to minimize the effect of further fragmentation
created by different breeds of RTAs. The problems with this approach are
first the resource constraints of the WTO, second the bounded rationality of
human beings, and third, whether a ‘one size fits all’ approach would work.
Yet another option offered is to strengthen the WTO’s monitoring system of
RTAs, with the 2006 rules on transparency being the most recent example.
Unfortunately, as the Committee on RTAs (CRTAs), the main enforcer of
the monitoring rules in the WTO, has been plagued with ineffectiveness
because of the consensus rule, heightened monitoring rules would not be
of much help either. In this article, we will discuss a fourth option, i.e. to use
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the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a venue for resolving RTA dis-
putes. The rationale underlying this initiative is that, by using the WTO
dispute settlement system for RTA disputes, the Members will be able to
develop a body of ‘common law’ on RTAs, which would then either form the
basis of multilateral rules on RTAs or harmonize RTAs. This way, we can try
to minimize the harmful effect of RTAs, and indeed turn RTAs from ‘stum-
bling blocks’ into ‘building blocks’ of the multilateral trading system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)1 have mush-
roomed world wide.2 The consensus in trade circles now is that ‘regionalism
is here to stay’,3 ‘will [not] disappear’,4 and that ‘little can be done to pre-
vent . . . [the] . . . spread of [RTAs]’.5 Such proliferation of RTAs has created
a renewed sense of urgency for the WTO. The WTO must act to avoid the
fate of being eclipsed into irrelevance. There are a number of options for the
WTO today.
The first option sees the WTO as an RTA ‘terminator’. Theoretically
speaking, the best approach would be to heighten the level of ambition in
global trade talks to reduce all trade barriers to zero so that the discrimina-
tory effect created by RTAs could be reduced or even eliminated.6 In reality,
however, such an approach probably would never be adopted by countries
for the following reasons. First, while an RTA, by reducing the tariffs of its
Members to zero at the regional level, increases the incentive for non-RTA
Members to urge WTO Members to reduce tariffs to zero at the WTO, it
will also increase the incentive for the RTA Members not to extend zero
tariffs to non-RTA Members for fear of erosion of their RTA preferences.7
As the decision whether to reduce tariffs is to be taken by RTA Members, it
is highly unlikely that they will choose to harm their own interests. Second,
even if assuming, arguendo, that somehow the Members to an RTA could
1 For the sake of consistency and clarity, we use the term ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ in this
article to refer to both Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Customs Unions (CU) under
GATT Article XXIV, as well as economic integration agreements under GATS Article V.
The word ‘regional’ carries no geographical connotations and agreements between parties
which are geographically remote from each other (such as the United States and Singapore)
are also included.
2 The Warwick Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? – The Report of
the First Warwick Commission (Warwick Report), 2007, at 45.
3 Richard Baldwin, ‘Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the
Path to Global Free Trade’, 29 (11) The World Economy 1451 (2006), at 1508.
4 Warwick Report, above n 2, at 53.
5 The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, Report by
the Consultative Board to Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (Sutherland Report), 2004,
para 103.
6 Ibid, para 104. Warwick Report, above n 2, at 51.
7 Sutherland Report, above n 5, para 104.
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overcome their fear of preference erosion and offer to non-RTA Members in
the WTO the same tariff concessions they can offer to their fellow Members,
it would be irrational to assume that they would be willing to offer more than
what they are willing to give each other at the regional level. As several
studies have shown, many RTAs have carved out certain sectors, with
agriculture being the most well-known example, from the tariff reduction
schedules.8 Thus, at least with regard to those sectors, the RTA has
entrenched trade protectionism and made it more difficult, rather than
easier, for RTA Members to agree to further reduce tariffs at the WTO.
Third, while history is filled with examples of the ebb and flow of regional
trade deals followed by major breakthroughs in multilateral trade negotia-
tions, thus far it has not been possible for multilateral economic integration
to reach the same level and depth of liberalization as regional economic
integration. While the increased technical complexity of trade negotiations
together with the increased number of participants is one explanation, a
more plausible explanation is that regional integration is rarely about trade
alone; instead, most RTAs, if not all, are driven more about the need to trade
small economic losses for major political and strategic gains.9 Offering zero
tariffs to everyone at the WTO, however, would not score any political gains
for most countries, as the WTO has become so large that it includes the
friends and rivals of almost every country.
The second option sees the WTO as an RTA ‘confessor’.10 If we think of
preferential treatment as a cardinal sin in the religion of free trade, the
‘terminator’ would wipe out those sins by eliminating the preferences.
Under the second option, countries might seek, through ‘confession’, to
alleviate their guilt even if they cannot wipe out their sins. According to
this view, the WTO could, first, provide objective research to help better
understand the impact of RTAs on non-Members; second, set up a negotiat-
ing forum for the coordination/standardization/harmonization of rules of
origin,11 and, third, draft ‘best practices’ or model RTAs12 to minimize
8 See e.g. WTO, World Trade Report 2007, at 309–10, which quotes a WTO Secretariat study in
2002 and a study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 2006.
9 For a discussion of the main motives for countries to enter RTA negotiations in the Asia
Pacific Region, see Henry Gao, ‘Synthesis Report’, in The New International Architecture in
Trade and Investment: Current Status and Implications (Singapore: Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Secretariat 2007) 10–13.
10 According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2002), a confessor is ‘[a] priest who heard confessions’. By the power granted by Christ,
confessors, i.e. ministers with proper qualifications, could forgive sins of believers. See
Catholic Encyclopedia: Sacrament of Penance, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11618c.htm
(visited 18 September 2008).
11 Baldwin, above n 3, at 1509–11.
12 See Warwick Report, above n 2, at 52. See also C.L. Lim, ‘Free Trade Agreements in Asia and
Some Common Legal Problems’, in Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich, and Jan Bohanes
(eds), The WTO in the Twenty-First Century: Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism
in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007) 434, 445–46, 454–55.
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the effect of further fragmentation created by different breeds of RTAs.
However, there are several reasons why this approach is not entirely
satisfactory.
First, while the authors agree that the WTO would be the best institution
to examine the pros and cons of different RTAs in the general sense, critical
findings on particular RTAs would make the WTO (Secretariat) vulnerable
to criticisms of infringing upon Member’s rights to conclude RTAs under
Article XXIV, and allegations of breaching the impartiality of the WTO and
the Secretariat. Moreover, as it will be politically incorrect for the WTO to
outsource such research to external researchers, the WTO most likely would
assign the work to its Trade Policy Review Division13 or the Economic
Research and Statistics Division.14 Even though these two are the largest
divisions among all the functional divisions in the WTO,15 their resources
are still limited if we consider the task to be performed, i.e. examining
the complex web of 400 RTAs16 which currently involve every WTO
Member but one.
Second, using the WTO to harmonize rules of origin is also difficult to
achieve. First of all, since many preferential rules of origin are intentionally
designed as devices to deny non-RTA Members preferences, it is doubtful
whether WTO member countries would be willing to get rid of these care-
fully crafted devices. Second, even if assuming such reluctance can be over-
come in most sectors, it would still be nearly impossible to streamline rules
of origin for some politically sensitive sectors.17 Third, even if the rules of
origin can be harmonized in general, the application of such standardized
rules of origin to particular products could still create problems. An example
of this would be a product which is manufactured with a 20% value-add in
each of the five countries to an RTA, while the WTO adopts a uniform 30%
value-add rule of origin for all RTAs with no provision for cumulation rules.
13 In addition to its main task of supporting the Trade Policy Review Body, the Trade Policy
Review Division also supports the work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.
See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm (visited 18 September 2008).
14 The functions of the Economic Research and Statistics Division are to provide ‘economic
analysis and research in support of the WTO’s operational activities, including monitoring
and reporting on current economic news and developments’, as well as supporting ‘WTO
Members and the Secretariat with quantitative information in relation to economic and
trade policy issues’. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm (visited
18 September 2008).
15 The Economic Research and Statistics Division currently has 50 staff members, while the
Trade Policy Review Division currently has about 39 staff members. See http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm (visited 18 September 2008).
16 According to the WTO Secretariat, there are close to 400 RTAs which are scheduled to
be implemented by 2010 if ‘we take into account RTAs which are in force but have not
been notified, those signed but not yet in force, those currently being negotiated, and those
in the proposal stage’. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (visited
18 September 2008).
17 Baldwin, above n 3, at 1511.
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Third, with regard to the role of the WTO as an authoritative source of
‘best practices’ for RTAs or a model RTA, the problems are that first, as
each country brings its unique blessings and predicaments to the RTA nego-
tiating table, a ‘one size fits all’ approach might not work. One possible
solution to this is to draft ‘best practices’ or a model RTA in such a way
that different options for a given rule are provided for potential RTAs to
choose from. The danger, however, is that a country would simply choose
the worst possible combinations resulting in a ‘Frankenstein’ RTA to defeat
the very purpose of having such best practices in the first place.
Yet another option offered is to turn the WTO into an ‘inquisitor’ by
strengthening the existing WTO monitoring system. The 2006 rules on
transparency is a recent example of this.18 Unfortunately, because the
Committee on RTAs (CRTAs) is hamstrung by the consensus rule, merely
having heightened monitoring rules would not be of much practical use here.
In this article, we discuss a fourth option, i.e. to make the WTO an
‘enforcer’ by using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a venue for
resolving at least some disputes among RTA parties, and possibly even dis-
putes between RTA and non-RTA WTO Members. In a certain sense, this
option complements rather than replaces the previous options. The rationale
underlying this initiative is that, by using the WTO dispute settlement system
for some RTA disputes, the Members will be able to develop, albeit gradually,
incrementally, and pragmatically, a body of ‘common law’ on RTAs. Such a
body of common principles could form the basis of multilateral rules on RTAs
or harmonize RTA rules. This could minimize the harmful effect of RTAs.
In order to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a ‘common good’
for RTAs, we have to answer three further questions:
First, can we use the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate at
least some RTA disputes?
Second, which rules can the WTO apply in RTA disputes?
Third, how can we equip the WTO machinery to deal with RTA
disputes?
In this article, we try to provide some preliminary thinking on these
matters in the hope that our suggestions will trigger greater discussion
about how the WTO could become more relevant given the current invasion
of RTAs.
II. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY JURISDICTION
Can the WTO dispute settlement system be used to address disputes arising
from RTAs? Consider two scenarios. The first concerns the power of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to adjudicate disputes which involve
18 Warwick Report, above n 2, at 52.
WTO Dispute Settlement for RTA Disputes 903
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jiel/article-abstract/11/4/899/891071
by Singapore Management University user
on 29 January 2018
general requirements imposed on the formation of RTAs under the relevant
WTO agreements. These include,19 for example, whether an RTA satisfies
the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement in GATT Article XXIV.8.b or the
‘substantial sectoral coverage’ requirement under GATS Article V, whether
an interim agreement exceeds the ‘reasonable length of time’ as provided for
under GATT Article XXIV.5.c, whether particular trade policy instruments
constitute ‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’ under GATT Article
XXIV.8.a.i, whether or not ‘the duties and other regulation of commerce’ for
non-Members are ‘higher or more restrictive’ than the pre-RTA level under
GATT Article XXIV.5, or how to determine if particular products are ‘pro-
ducts originating in such territories [of RTA Members]’, etc. Most of these
are pre-conditions that an RTA must satisfy before its Members could invoke
GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V to justify its deviation from the
Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation. As the CRTA was given an explicit
mandate to examine individual regional agreements,20 there used to be
doubt about whether the WTO Panel and Appellate Body could conduct
the examination themselves. In the Turkey – Textile case, however, the
Appellate Body made it clear that the Panel does have the necessary jurisdic-
tion to examine the consistency of an RTA with the requirements under
GATT Article XXIV.21 While the Appellate Body’s ruling on this issue has
been subject to the criticism that it upsets the institutional balance between
the WTO’s political and judicial organs,22 this is probably the only practical
solution. Otherwise Article XXIV could be used to justify all kinds of
violations of GATT obligations. Moreover, the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) specifically
mandates a Panel to ‘address the relevant provisions in any covered agree-
ment or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute’23 and make ‘an
objective assessment of . . . the applicability of and conformity with the rele-
vant covered agreements.’24 It seems then that a Panel could be in breach of
its obligations under the DSU if it fails to address the consistency of an RTA
with the requirements under GATT Article XXIV. After all, Article XXIV
itself is a provision in the ‘covered agreements’. This is further confirmed by
the understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994.
19 For a summary of the legal issues involved in the interpretation of the relevant WTO provi-
sions, see Synopsis of ‘Systemic’ Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements: Note by the
Secretariat, WT/REG/W/37, 2 March 2000. For an empirical rather than normative analysis
of these issues, see World Trade Report 2007, above n 8, at 307–12.
20 WT/L/127.
21 See Lim, above n 12, at 434.
22 Frieder Roessler, ‘The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and Political Organs of the
WTO’, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (eds), New Directions in International
Economic Law (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 325.
23 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
Article 7.1.
24 DSU Article 11.
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It provides that ‘any matters arising from the application of those provisions
of Article XXIV’ shall be subject to the normal dispute settlement procedure
under the DSU.
The second issue concerns the power of the WTO DSB to adjudicate
disputes on substantive rules in individual RTAs. In order to fully discuss
this question, we need to make a few observations at the outset.
First, according to a number of DSU articles, including Articles 1.1, 3.2,
7.1, and 11, the jurisdiction of WTO Panels is facially limited to claims
under the WTO covered agreements.25
Second, while a Panel is obliged to ‘address the relevant provisions in any
covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute’26 and
make ‘an objective assessment of . . . the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements’,27 there is no obligation for a Panel to
address provisions that are not part of a ‘covered agreement’. On the
other hand, just like a judicial organ or arbitral body, the Panel has inherent
jurisdictional powers. Pauwelyn characterized such powers as powers of
‘incidental or implied jurisdiction’, and he took this to mean the jurisdiction
(i) ‘to interpret the submissions of the parties’ in order to ‘isolate the real
issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim’; (ii) to determine
whether one has substantive jurisdiction to decide a matter (the principle of
la compe´tence de la compe´tence); (iii) to decide whether one should refrain from
exercising validly established substantive jurisdiction;28 and (iv) to decide all
matters linked to the exercise of substantive jurisdiction and inherent in the
judicial function (such as claims under rules on the burden of proof, due
process, and other general international law rules on the judicial settlement
of disputes or state responsibility, including the power to order cessation,
assurances of non-repetition, and reparations).29
Thus, where a substantive rule is provided for under only the RTA but not
under any WTO agreement, it can only provide the basis for a claim under
the RTA but not the WTO. This also means that the WTO Panel will
apparently have no jurisdiction in such a case. One example would be an
RTA which, for example, contains national treatment obligations for the legal
services sector. If none of the RTA Members have scheduled such an obliga-
tion in their GATS schedule in the WTO, disputes arising from the RTA
commitment can only be brought under the RTA’s dispute settlement
system. Another example is where an RTA contains an investment chapter
25 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role Of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far can We Go?’,
95 (3) American Journal of International Law 535 (2001), at 554. See also Joost Pauwelyn,
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), Chapter 8.
26 DSU Article 7.1.
27 See above n 24.
28 Note that we disagree with this statement. See discussion below.
29 Pauwelyn, above n 25 (2001), at 555–56.
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akin to NAFTA Chapter 11, and which provides for an investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism. Such disputes typically cannot be brought before the
WTO.30 Note that in the example given, the reason why the dispute cannot
be brought before the WTO is because the substantive obligations do not
arise from the WTO ‘covered agreements’, not because the RTA has its own
dispute settlement mechanism or that the RTA mechanism is meant to be
exclusive. We will return to this issue below.
The most problematic situation, however, is where both the RTA and the
WTO contains overlapping substantive obligations, thus a claim is possible
under either regime. This would be a situation of ‘true conflict’ or jurisdic-
tional overlap. An example would be the national treatment obligation for
goods, something which can be found under both the WTO and many
RTAs. In such cases, as the obligation arises from the ‘covered agreements’
of the WTO, the WTO dispute settlement system clearly has jurisdiction
over the claim. The more difficult question, however, is whether that
jurisdiction should be exclusive. DSU Article 23 seems to suggest that this
is the case, where it states that:31
‘When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements,
they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding.’
‘In such cases, Members shall . . . not make a determination to the effect that
a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that
the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded,
except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination con-
sistent with the findings contained in the Panel or Appellate Body report
adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this
Understanding . . .’
This view (i.e. of exclusive WTO jurisdiction) would be fairly uncontro-
versial in the following kinds of cases:
(1) where the RTA does not include any dispute settlement provision, or
(2) where an RTA provides applicable rules to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts between the RTA and the WTO, and where such provisions
explicitly make the WTO the forum of choice in case of conflict.
This might be referred to as the ‘exclusive forum selection clause’
30 One more obvious exception may relate to services trade via mode-3 (commercial presence);
see Lim, above n 12, at 434, 445–46, 454–55.
31 DSU Article 23 (emphasis added).
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scenario. An example is the EC–Chile Interim Agreement,32 which
provides in Article 189.4.(c) that:
Unless the Parties otherwise agree, when a Party seeks redress of a viola-
tion of an obligation under this Part of the Agreement which is equivalent
in substance to an obligation under the WTO, it shall have recourse to the
relevant rules and procedures of the WTO Agreement, which apply not-
withstanding the provisions of this Agreement.33
To sum up, the WTO definitely has exclusive jurisdiction in cases regarding
the general requirements for RTAs in the relevant WTO agreements, but
does not have jurisdiction in cases concerning substantive rules which are
only provided for in the RTA. Beyond these two scenarios, we enter relatively
uncharted waters.
III. WTO–RTA JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
Short of simply saying that DSU Article 23.2.(a) means that WTO Members
have no recourse but to submit to WTO dispute settlement whenever there
is a question involving the violation of an obligation under a covered agree-
ment of the WTO, the exclusivity of WTO jurisdiction may be called into
question in situations involving the following:
(1) An exclusive forum selection clause, electing RTA dispute settlement:
the most obvious example is where there exists an exclusive forum
selection clause choosing the RTA as the exclusive forum for all
disputes or a certain class of disputes.
(2) A non-exclusive forum selection clause: the RTA provides for an
alternative dispute settlement system in addition to the one available
under the WTO and gives the Members the choice to resort to either
system even if the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the WTO.
This method may be found, for example, in Article 56(2) of the
EFTA–Singapore FTA.34 Another example is Article 1 of
MERCOSUR’s Olivos Protocol.35
(3) The lis alibi pendens approach: another model, which is tagged onto the
EFTA–Singapore FTA and Olivos Protocol model above, requires the
32 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, done at Brussels,
18 November 2002. Available online at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecchil
fta.pdf (visited 18 September 2008).
33 Of course, critics might point out that it is difficult to say whether the negotiators considered
that such a clause was required under WTO law, or that it was simply preferable. The phrase
‘unless the Parties otherwise agree’ may be interpreted to mean that the parties never con-
sidered this a WTO legal requirement.
34 EFTA–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 26 June 2002.
35 The Protocol of Olivos for the Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUR, 18 February 2002.
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dispute to be brought exclusively within the RTA’s dispute settlement
procedure where the dispute is first submitted under that procedure
(i.e. as opposed to WTO dispute settlement). Under such a ‘lis pendens’
clause approach, it could also work the other way. A dispute brought
before WTO dispute settlement could preclude the same dispute being
brought under the RTA. In addition to the two examples above, the
most famous example of this sort of forum selection clause is Article
2005.6 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),36
which states that:
Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article
2007 or dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated under the
GATT, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other,
unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.
As we can see, that example also contains an exception to the rule. Another
interesting feature is that unlike the post-WTO RTAs, NAFTA Article
2005.6 as with its predecessor rule, Article 1801 of the Canada–US FTA,
is lex priori and therefore may be said to be subject to the later rule in DSU
Article 23.37 The same cannot be said of post-WTO RTAs.
(4) The res judicata or collateral estoppel approach:38 another variant is
to eschew the lis alibi pendens approach in favour of a res judicata or
collateral estoppel approach. An example would be Article 26 of
MERCOSUR’s Olivos Protocol. Notwithstanding the Olivos
Protocol, Brazil still argued in the Argentina – Poultry case that the
res judicata rule did not apply as it was bringing a fresh dispute on a
different legal basis before WTO dispute settlement.39
(5) The comity approach: comity is a principle whereby a court declines
to exercise jurisdiction over matters that would be more appropriately
heard by another tribunal. In a recent article,40 Henckels argues that,
following the examples set by other international tribunals such as
36 http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=78 (visited 18 September
2008).
37 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London:
Routledge 2005) 149.
38 We have not sought to distinguish clearly between these two concepts in the present article.
Put simply, in the case of collateral estoppel there does not have to be a litigation on the same
claims for the doctrine to operate. See further Hunt v B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F.
Supp 885 (1980) (United States District Court, Northern District of Texas). See further
Adrian Briggs, Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002) 132 ff on the
(English) common law distinction between ‘recognition’ and ‘enforcement’ in private inter-
national law.
39 Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina –
Poultry), WT/DS241/R, adopted 19 May 2003, DSR 2003:V, 1727, para. 7.22.
40 Caroline Henckels, ‘Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO FTA Nexus:
A Potential Approach for the WTO’, 19 European Journal of International Law 571 (2008).
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the arbitral tribunal
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
WTO should use its ‘inherent power to apply comity’ and decline to
exercise jurisdiction in appropriate cases of competing jurisdiction.41
However, there are several problems with this approach, the most
notable one being that there is no textual basis in the DSU for
this.42 Henckels argues, however, that ‘[t]he inherent power to find
no jurisdiction in limine litis or to decline to exercise jurisdiction
arises notwithstanding the text of the DSU, unless these inherent
powers are specifically extinguished or modified in the text’.43
One difficulty with this approach is that if a Panel were to apply
comity and decline jurisdiction in a particular case, it may be accused
of having breached its obligation under the DSU not to ‘add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agree-
ments’44 and violated the rights of WTO Members to ‘have recourse
to . . . the rules and procedures of [the DSU]’.45 Indeed, as Henckels
concedes, this is how the WTO Panel and Appellate Body have
approached the issue in Mexico – Soft Drinks and Argentina –
Poultry, two cases where, according to Henckel’s theory, the WTO
should have applied the comity principle.46 There seems to be a
reluctance, at the very least, on the WTO’s side to press the
comity argument too far.
(6) Further complexities arise where the RTA includes a provision not
to invoke WTO dispute settlement system between the parties. This
could mean that the dispute should be referred to the RTA tribunal, or
that there is no dispute settlement system at all and all disputes shall be
settled by consultations and negotiations among the parties. An exam-
ple for the latter case is Article 19.5 of the Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement (CEPA) between Mainland China and Hong Kong,
which provides that ‘any problems arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CEPA’ shall be resolved ‘through consultation
in the spirit of friendship and cooperation’.47
41 Ibid, at 584 ff.
42 Ibid, at 593–94.
43 Ibid, at 594.
44 DSU Article 3.2.
45 DSU Article 23.1.
46 In Mexico – Soft Drinks, for example, the Appellate Body not only did not adopt the comity
principle, but also explained in detail how the principle is inconsistent with several key
DSU provisions, including Articles 3.2, 7.1, 7.2, 11, 19.2, and 23. See Appellate Body
Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Mexico – Soft Drinks),
WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, paras 47–57.
47 http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/fulltext.html (visited 18 September 2008).
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While these cases all differ from each other in some ways, the key legal
issue involved in all of them is the same, i.e. whether a party can challenge
the jurisdiction of the Panel in a case by resorting to non-WTO law and
whether in turn the Panel can decline to exercise jurisdiction by appealing to
non-WTO law.
The Appellate Body’s jurisprudence is equivocal at best on this point.
Perhaps the most basic assumption is that RTAs form an exception to the
WTO system. Based on this assumption, the impression created is that any
overlap between RTA and WTO dispute settlement is the exception, not the
rule. This is based on the view that RTAs are themselves the exception, at
the very least to the MFN doctrine, under GATT Article XXIV and GATS
Article V. Therefore, while the DSU includes GATT and GATS as covered
agreements, RTAs emerged as ‘uncovered’ agreements and therefore fall into
a dispute settlement vacuum. Whether this is true remains contestable. At
present, controversy continues as to the extent to which GATT Article XXIV
provides an exception to WTO obligations other than the MFN principle.
The issue has arisen in relation to safeguards, for example.48 Similar argu-
ments may also be offered in relation to RTA dispute settlement
mechanisms.
Is the assumption that RTAs form an exception to the WTO system, in
other words that they fall into a ‘black hole’, justified? The suggestion
receives some support from the Appellate Body’s ruling in Mexico – Soft
Drinks, where the Appellate Body seems to have considered that NAFTA
disputes are ‘non-WTO disputes’, and that it is not the function of panels
and the Appellate Body to adjudicate upon such non-WTO disputes.49
Before Mexico – Soft Drinks, the Panel ruling in Argentina – Poultry had,
quite sensibly, suggested that a WTO Panel may construe an RTA in relation
to a provision therein governing the relationship between the RTA and WTO
dispute settlement.50 The decision of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Soft
Drinks, however, seems to have cast some doubt on the Panel’s decision in
Argentina – Poultry.
The Appellate Body in Mexico – Soft Drinks also went on to suggest that an
overlap with RTA regulation will not necessarily prevent WTO dispute set-
tlement, as Panels and the Appellate Body do not have discretion to decline
to rule in cases brought before them barring any special circumstances.
48 See, e.g. Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements’,
7 Journal of International Economic Law 109 (2004).
49 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, above n 47, paras 56, 78.
50 Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry, above n 40, para 7.27. There, the Panel had gone on to
interpret the Protocol of Brasilia, ruling that on its proper construction the Brasilia Protocol
does not limit the right of the parties to bring WTO Panel proceedings in relation to a
measure which is already the subject of a dispute under that protocol.
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But the Appellate Body appears also to have confined itself specifically to
‘the case . . . before it’.51 One possible reading is that the Appellate Body
would not rule on non-WTO disputes and would usually not decline juris-
diction because, absent ‘other circumstances’, it would not have the discre-
tion to do so.52 Exercising judicial economy, however, the Appellate Body
did not further explain what might constitute such ‘special’ or ‘other’
circumstances.
Can Mexico – Soft Drinks be read to suggest that in exceptional circum-
stances at least WTO Panels or the Appellate Body may decline their own
jurisdiction in favour of RTA dispute settlement? If so, might this also be
taken to suggest that having separate RTA dispute settlement procedures is
not per se violative of DSU Article 23? Is a conflicting RTA provision a
ground for invoking such exceptional circumstances—what the Appellate
Body in Mexico – Soft Drinks referred to blandly as ‘other circumstances’
in a highly couched ruling? Does Mexico – Soft Drinks mean that RTA dis-
pute settlement clauses could, in exceptional or special circumstances, prevail
over WTO dispute settlement?
Even if the answer to all of the questions above is ‘yes’, it would still be
worthwhile to consider, or even to make, the WTO at least an optional
forum for the RTA parties for the reasons we suggest later in this article.
If the WTO were to serve such a function, the current DSU may however
require amendment so that the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel and Appellate
Body would not be limited, at least in some cases, to ‘covered agreements’.
This is especially important where no general rule of international law
may be relied upon to resolve the problem by way of some interpretative
or jurisdictional rule.
The largest question here would have to do with when the WTO should
have the jurisdictional authority to develop RTA rules. Should the WTO
confine itself to resolving situations of conflict only, or should it play a
larger role? We will return to this jurisdictional problem after dealing with
the question of applicable law below.
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
The problem here is related but not exactly the same as the first question.
Can the WTO Panel and Appellate Body apply the non-WTO rules in a
WTO dispute? It is important to note the difference between the two sorts
of question from the outset. Clearly, some questions, on the basis of the
Mexico – Soft Drinks doctrine cannot fall to be adjudicated by WTO dispute
settlement. But it begs the question of what rules Panels and the Appellate
Body can and cannot apply, or in an even further refinement, when it
51 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, above n 47, paras 54, 57.
52 Ibid, para 54.
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has jurisdiction over the parties to the dispute, and when such jurisdiction is
precluded over certain subject-matter involving the rules to be applied. Here,
we distinguish between ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘applicable law’ for the sake of
simplicity.53 Put a little differently, a principal difference is that while
the jurisdictional question is mainly concerned with the jurisdictional basis
for a claim in a dispute, the question of applicable law is about what
arguments you may use to support your own claim, or to defend your-
self against claims made by others. As the Appellate Body stated in
EC – Hormones, even though ‘Panels are inhibited from addressing legal
claims falling outside their terms of reference’, ‘nothing in the DSU limits
the faculty of a Panel freely to use arguments submitted by any of the
parties – or to develop its own legal reasoning – to support its own find-
ings and conclusions on the matter under its consideration’.54 Thus,
the inquiry on applicable law could be totally independent of the jurisdic-
tional question.
While perhaps no WTO scholar would seriously disagree that the
DSU limits the jurisdiction of the Panel to claims brought under WTO
covered agreements,55 the real question is whether, in examining such
53 Part of the difficulty has to do with the highly undeveloped categories of jurisdiction ratione
personae, jurisdiction ratione materiae and choice of law known elsewhere in both private and
public international law thinking. It might be said that these categories do not apply to our
present question because WTO jurisdiction ratione personae is given in the case of a WTO
member. But this begs the question. Is that jurisdiction given in the case of WTO member-
ship or in the case of WTO membership in the absence of a competing RTA rule? In the
usual context in which that distinction operates, a sovereign may be immune ratione personae
from the jurisdiction of a domestic court, whereas even if such immunity is defeated in
exceptional situations, a domestic court may not have jurisdiction over the attachment or
execution of the property of a foreign sovereign. See, e.g. C.L. Lim, ‘Non-Recognition of
Putative Foreign States (Taiwan) under Singapore’s State Immunity Act’, 11 Asian Yearbook
of International Law 3 (2003–04), esp. 18 ff. Likewise, in private international law, the
distinction, loosely speaking, between personal jurisdiction and prescriptive/legislative/
subject-matter jurisdiction is generally well known and established in common law countries
even if the details may differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—e.g. personal
jurisdiction has a constitutional dimension in the United States, whereas the distinction
between personal and subject-matter jurisdiction may not be so clear or may not even exist
under a civilian system which may tailor jurisdictional questions to factors such as the place of
the characteristic performance of the contract or the place of the commission of the tort thus
emphasizing the connection with the claim as opposed to the defendant for example. See,
e.g. Ralph H. Folsom et al., International Business Transactions: A Problem Oriented Coursebook
(9th edn, St Paul Minnesota: Thomson/West 2006)1192. These issues and their attendant
complexities need not detain us. However, it has been suggested that similar notions of
judicial comity should be applied where there are conflicts between international tribunals.
See our discussion of the comity principle in this article. See also the discussion of the MOX
Plant dispute in Lim, above n 12, at 453.
54 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, para 156.
55 DSU Article 1.1. See, e.g. Joost Pauwelyn, ‘How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-
WTO Law: Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits’, 37 Journal of World Trade 997 (2003), at
1000; Pauwelyn, above n 26 (2003), at 443–45.
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claims, non-WTO norms could be brought into play. Generally speaking,
non-WTO rules might be introduced in WTO dispute settlement process
under three different circumstances.
The first is to use non-WTO rules, mostly general principles of law, to
solve procedural issues which have not been clearly spelled out in WTO
rules.56 Examples include the participation of private lawyers in Panel pro-
ceedings, the admissibility of amicus briefs in Panel and Appellate Body
proceedings,57 treatment of domestic law as questions of law or facts, etc.
Even though neither the DSU nor any other WTO agreement has explicitly
provided the power to apply these rules to the Panel or Appellate Body,58 these
issues have largely been uncontroversial because they are widely regarded as
implied powers of a tribunal and it would have been very difficult for the
Panels or the Appellate Body to carry out their job without such powers.59
The second is to use rules of treaty interpretation to interpret certain
provisions in the covered agreements. This relates mainly to the treaty inter-
pretation rules under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),60
especially the rules under Articles 31 and 32. While there might be some
uncertainty as to whether the Panel and Appellate Body had such a power
during the early days of the existence of the WTO, such doubt has since
dissipated, especially since the Appellate Body made the resounding warning
that WTO rules shall not be read ‘in clinical isolation’ from public interna-
tional law in the US – Gasoline case.61 That pronouncement rests on the
explicit reference to ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international
law’ in the DSU as tools for clarifying WTO provisions.62
56 For resort to such ‘non-consensual’ general principles in the public international law field, see
O.A. Elias and C.L. Lim, ‘General Principles of Law, ‘‘Soft’’ Law and the Identification of
International Law’, 28 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 (1997), at 4–44.
57 Even though some WTO members argue that the admissibility of amicus briefs affect their
substantive rights, there remains a strong body of opinion among members that the issue is
mainly procedural in nature. See further, C.L. Lim, ‘The Amicus Brief Issue at the WTO’, 4
Chinese Journal of International Law 85 (2005), esp. 99, 105, 108, 109–10 for a survey of
these differing opinions among the several delegations in Geneva.
58 Of course, one may argue that the statement in DSU Article 11 that the Panel shall ‘make
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in the covered agreements’ (emphasis added) implicitly grant such
powers to panel, while the Appellate Body has been explicitly granted the powers to draft
working procedures for appellate review by Article 17.9.
59 See also Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: With
Special Reference to International Arbitration (London: Longmans 1927) 215–96.
60 Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331.
61 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(US – Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 17.
62 See further, C.L. Lim, ‘Law and Diplomacy in World Trade Disputes’, 6 Singapore Journal
of International & Comparative Law 436 (2002), at 470–71.
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The third is to apply non-WTO rules as norms that create substantive,
rather than procedural, rights and obligations. As we have discussed earlier,
under the current WTO regime, non-WTO norms cannot be invoked as
basis for staking out claims in a dispute; instead, their only possible sub-
stantive use would be as defense against claims of violation or justification for
adopting measures which are inconsistent with WTO obligations. This is the
hardest of the three scenarios, and it is also where the real controversy lies.
This third scenario can be analysed at two levels: first, whether such non-
WTO norms could be invoked by parties and applied by Panels at all;
second, even if they could be invoked despite running against WTO
norms (which would typically be the case as otherwise the party invoking
them would have relied on some WTO provision instead), whether they may
prevail against WTO norms.63
To some commentators, the answer to the first question is yes. Pauwelyn,
for example, has argued that ‘the fact that the substantive jurisdiction of
WTO panels is limited to claims under WTO covered agreements does
not mean that the applicable law available to a WTO panel is necessarily
limited to WTO covered agreements’.64 He offers the following reasons.
First, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have not limited themselves to
the four corners of WTO covered agreements: they have referred to general
principles of law and customary international law, such as the VCLT.65
In this sense, rules other than the WTO’s treaty rules can be applied in
WTO proceedings.
A key assumption underlying Pauwelyn’s argument is that there is no legal
basis in ‘the four corners of WTO covered agreements’ for the application of
the VCLT. A closer examination of the Appellate Body’s famous statement
in US – Gasoline reveals, however, that the reference to general principles of
law and customary international law or even the VCLT by the Panel and the
Appellate Body is made exactly pursuant to the mandate within ‘the four
corners of WTO covered agreements’ as the Appellate Body clearly based
its decision on the requirement under Article 3.2 of the DSU that the
Panel and the Appellate Body shall ‘clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’.66 Moreover, the mere fact that Panels and the Appellate
Body have referred to rules of interpretation to help clarify the meaning
63 Some of the issues discussed here were explored in a different context in Henry Gao,
‘The Mighty Pen, the Almighty Dollar, and the Holy Hammer and Sickle: An examination
of the conflict between trade liberalization and domestic cultural policy with special regard to
the recent dispute between the US and China on restrictions on certain cultural products’,
2 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 313 (2007), at 333–36.
64 Pauwelyn, above n 26 (2001), at 560. See also Pauwelyn, above n 26 (2003), at 460 ff.
65 Pauwelyn, above n 58, at 1001.
66 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 64, at 17.
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of the substantive obligations in the covered agreements does not necessarily
mean that they can refer to other non-WTO rules to change the substantive
obligations under the WTO covered agreements.
Second, Pauwelyn notes that, among those ‘customary rules of interpreta-
tion of public international law’ referred to in DSU Article 3.2 lies Article
31.3 of the VCLT. It states that the treaty interpreter shall take into account
not only the treaty itself, but also ‘any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions’.67 In this further sense, he argues that ‘non-WTO law’ can and
should be applied in WTO cases.
Unfortunately, this is, again, a misreading. First of all, while Article 31
states that a treaty shall be interpreted ‘in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty’, the ‘subsequent agreement’ and
‘relevant rules of international law’ are only to be ‘taken into account, together
with the context’ (emphasis added). This means that, while the terms of the
treaty at issue shall be directly applied, the other relevant agreements and
rules shall only be used to supplement the interpretation based on the context
and may not be applied directly. Second, the scope of such agreements is not
as expansive as Pauwelyn may have suggested. Instead, only subsequent
agreements which are concluded ‘between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ (emphasis added) could be
used as a supplementary interpretive tool. It means that the only agreements
which can be invoked are those which are both made between exactly the
same parties to the original agreement and regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions specifically. It is easy to see that
most RTAs would not satisfy either requirement, because first, RTAs are, by
definition, limited to a subset of WTO Members; and second, they are
mainly concerned with establishing obligations beyond those agreed in the
WTO rather than the interpretation or application of WTO obligations. For
these reasons, RTA rules should not be applicable in WTO disputes.
Third, according to Pauwelyn, the WTO agreement is a treaty and there-
fore is part of public international law. Thus, ‘even without the explicit
confirmation in DSU Article 3.2, the WTO agreement cannot . . . be applied
in isolation from other rules of international law’.68 To illustrate his point,
Pauwelyn draws an analogy between contract law and international law.69
Just as private contracts are automatically born into a system of domestic law,
so treaties are automatically born into the system of international law. Much the
way private contracts do not need to list all the relevant legislative and admin-
istrative provisions of domestic law for them to be applicable to the contract,
67 Pauwelyn, above n 58, at 1001.
68 See above n 66.
69 See above n 67.
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so treaties need not explicitly set out rules of general international law for them
to be applicable to the treaty.
However, this argument is probably not as strong as it might at first appear.
An initial objection may be dealt with swiftly. First, the basic assumption
underlying Pauwelyn’s analogy has to do with the degree of similarity
between domestic and international legal systems. The analogy is not alto-
gether unproblematic. As Philip Allott puts it, the international legal system
still lacks ‘most of the essential characteristics of their national legal sys-
tems’.70 Assuming however that such an analogy is sustainable in the present
case, the real reason behind the parties’ decision to enter into private con-
tracts is not because they want to incorporate general contract rules, but
because they want to vary the default rules between them absent explicit
provisions in each individual contract.71 Thus, to say that general interna-
tional law applies even when the WTO Members have decided to establish
some specific rights and obligations in the covered agreements ignores the
purpose of WTO Members in taking the trouble to negotiate WTO agree-
ments in the first place. At the very least it begs the question of what general,
background international rights and obligations the Members have sought to
vary, and which they have sought to leave intact. One example is the extent
to which the WTO’s dispute settlement rules have been intended to replace
the classic international law rule that self-help might be resorted to in the
face of a breach of an international treaty obligation.72 The usual answer is
that this is the whole point of the DSU. Yet what this article tries to show is
that the answer is not as simple as it seems. There may yet be further trade
obligations undertaken outside the WTO which are subject to rules con-
cerning their breach and the consequences of such breach which stand in
uneasy relation to the WTO rules on dispute settlement. Third, even accept-
ing that ‘treaties are automatically born into the system of international law’
just like private contracts,73 it does not necessarily follow that the DSB must
70 Philip Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’, 10 European Journal of International Law
31 (1999), at 35.
71 Put differently, treaties are ‘more individualistic’ than customary or general international law,
see O.A. Elias and C.L. Lim, The Paradox of Consensualism inInternational Law (Hague:
Kluwer 1998) 183. See further, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford:
Clarendon 1992), Chapter 3.
72 What trade lawyers see as unilateral retaliation, international lawyers might view as lawful
countermeasures instead and they would have a long line of international legal authorities
which might also suggest that the power to modify the law of countermeasures is limited. See
further, the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), ICJ,
25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997; Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of
27 March 1946, US–France Arbitral Tribunal, 9 December 1978, RIAA Vol. XVIII.
73 The ‘contract model’ does in fact inform much of McNair’s classic Law of Treaties (Oxford:
Clarendon 1961) but is beside the point. The debate came to the fore in the context
of the succession of newly independent states to colonial treaty obligations, see R.P.
Anand, New States and International Law (Delhi: Vikas 1972); S. Prakash Sinha,
‘Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International
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necessarily apply non-WTO norms in WTO disputes. Again the question
here is related to jurisdiction: the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel is not
a tribunal of general jurisdiction; instead its jurisdiction is only limited to
claims founded on WTO rules.74 Fourth, notwithstanding our previous
analysis, even if we agree with Pauwelyn that WTO norms ‘are automatically
born into the system of international law’ and that international law should
simply be applied in WTO disputes without further qualification, it will not
be of any help to the argument that RTA rules should be applied by Panels
and the Appellate Body in WTO disputes. The reason is simply that most
RTAs did not even exist when the GATT or the WTO was established, thus
it is more accurate to state that the RTA rules are born into a system of
WTO rules which in its relation with general international law is properly
considered to be lex specialis.
Fourth, while Pauwelyn recognizes that Article 3.2 specifies that the WTO
Panel or the Appellate Body cannot ‘change’ the WTO treaty, he argues that
this does not limit the extent to which WTO Members may conclude or have
concluded other treaties that can influence their mutual WTO rights and
obligations.75 Thus, Pauwelyn concludes:
As important as the distinction is between Panel jurisdiction (WTO claims only)
and applicable law (potentially all international law), so too is the distinction
between interpreting WTO rules (and the prohibition to add or detract from
those rules in the process) and examining WTO claims in the context of other
applicable international law (where the expression of state consent and conflict
rules of international law must decide the outcome).76
As Pauwelyn does not provide further illustration on this point in his
article, it is not always clear what exactly he means by this. One logical
interpretation of the argument seems to be this:
Even though the Panel and the Appellate Body have no power to change the
rights and obligations of the Members, the Members themselves can always
conclude other treaties (such as RTAs) to change their rights and obligations
under the WTO. To give effect to these treaties, the panel and the Appellate Body
shall have the power to apply them in WTO disputes as well. Otherwise, the
power of Members to conclude other treaties would be diminished.
Law’, 14 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 128 (1965); Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The
Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law’, 8 Howard Law Journal 95
(1962).
74 Joel Trachtman, ‘Book Review: Conflict of Norms in Public International Law by Joost
Pauwelyn’, 98 American Journal of International Law 855 (2004), at 858.
75 Pauwelyn, above n 58, at 1002–03.
76 Ibid, at 1003.
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While Article 30.3 of the VCLT seems to confirm Pauwelyn’s argument by
stating that ‘[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the
later treaty . . . , the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions
are compatible with those of the later treaty’, anyone who rushes to the
conclusion that the VCLT is applicable here would fail to appreciate the
crucial differences between the rights and obligations established under
WTO agreements and those under the garden variety of multilateral treaties.
First of all, for concessions on trade in goods, while most of the tariff
negotiations today are formula based, the GATT/WTO regime has a long
history of negotiating tariffs based on other approaches. Moreover, even
today, not all negotiations on goods are based on formulae as there are
special rules for tariff cuts by developing countries or sensitive products by
certain countries. This is more so with trade in services, which has been
dominated by a bilateral request-offer approach.77 This means that, when
two countries negotiate an RTA and cut all tariffs to zero, they are not only
making concessions on the products which they themselves are most inter-
ested in, they are also extending concessions on products which do not
interest the other party. Yet, through the operation of the MFN principle,
it will affect the interests of a third country which has a keen export interest
in such products. This is wholly different from the case of say, a treaty
between three countries to solve their border disputes. Now suppose two
of the three countries later on make another treaty to change a boundary
on their mutual border but this does not affect the border of the third
country, of course the second treaty would not have affected the interests
of the third country. In contrast, because of the MFN rule, the multilateral,
even the plurilateral, obligations of the WTO are not merely ‘bilateral obli-
gations multiplied’.78 They have a very far reaching effect.
Second, the legal effect of an RTA is only to create new rights and obliga-
tions for the Members under the RTA regime, rather than changing the
rights and obligations under the ‘covered agreements’ of the WTO. The
reason for this, as argued by Trachtman, is that since the WTO
Agreement provides exclusive procedures to be followed in amending the
obligations under the ‘covered agreements’, any amendment must follow
such prescribed procedures before it could change the content of the
‘covered agreements’ under the WTO.79 Of course, this does not mean
that WTO Members cannot change their trade obligations outside of the
77 See Henry Gao, ‘Evaluating Alternative Approaches to GATS: Negotiations: Sectoral,
Formulae and Other Alternatives’, in Pierre Sauve´, Marion Panizzon, and Nicole Pohl
(eds), GATS and The Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2008) 183–208.
78 Even if strictly they are because the MFN rule is agreed between each WTO member with
the others in what might be viewed as an accumulation of bilateral relationships. It is in this
sense that the MFN rule has the magical effect of being a ‘tariff accelerator’.
79 Trachtman, above n 74, at 859.
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WTO framework. However, even if such non-WTO rules are agreed between
the parties, such modifications would not usually be applicable law in WTO
dispute settlement.80
This leads us to the third point, i.e. for those RTAs which either do not
provide for formal dispute settlement, or which do provide a dispute settle-
ment system which is however not compulsory, the very fact that Members
to such RTAs intentionally chose to shun the WTO dispute settlement
system, or any dispute settlement system for that matter, probably means
that they never intended to make such an agreement enforceable through the
WTO dispute settlement system. If, however, the Panel follows Pauwelyn’s
advice and decides to drag a member into a formal WTO dispute settlement
proceeding, that is clearly an infringement upon the sovereign rights of a
member which never intended to be held to account in the WTO for
breaches of its obligations under these non-WTO treaties.
Assuming, arguendo, that the RTA rules could be invoked in WTO dis-
putes, should such rules, to the extent that they are inconsistent with WTO
norms, prevail over WTO rules? For many public international lawyers, the
answer seems to be yes when one applies the two familiar rules for resolving
treaty conflicts, i.e. lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali.81
The arguments are that, first, because the RTAs are concluded after the
WTO agreements have been concluded, they are later rules and must prevail
over prior rules; second, because the RTAs are special rules which are cre-
ated on top of the general rules under the WTO agreements, the RTA rules
must prevail as well. Again, however, the issues are not that simple. First of
all, as we all know, the WTO rules are not carved in stone; instead, both the
general rules for the WTO and the specific concessions of individual
Members are periodically modified in successive rounds of trade negotia-
tions. Thus, even if we agree that an RTA which was concluded in 2000
prevails over the WTO agreements concluded in 1994, then should whatever
results Members manage to reach in the Doha Round, say in 2010, also
prevail over all RTAs among WTO Members between 1994 and 2010?
Second, even though most RTAs are concluded after the WTO came into
being, there are some RTAs, such as NAFTA, which were concluded before
the WTO agreements entered into force. If we agree that the lex posterior rule
is applicable here, does it mean that these RTAs have been effectively ren-
dered useless by the establishment of the WTO? At the very least, an attempt
to resolve the issue by resorting to the lex posteriori rule would produce
arbitrary solutions each time. It would amount to nothing more than check-
erboard justice.82 Third, to the extent that the lex posterior and lex specialis
80 Ibid.
81 See further, Michael Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of Sources of International Law’, 47 British
Yearbook of International Law 273 (1974–95).
82 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge/Massachusetts: Belknap 1996)178–84.
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rules are applicable, they can only be applied among laws which are of the
same hierarchy. That is why the Marrakesh Agreement states in Article
XVI.3 that ‘[i]n the event of a conflict between a provision of this
Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements,
the provision of [the Marrakesh] Agreement shall prevail to the extent of
the conflict.’ Thus, to the extent that a WTO obligation may be said to be
situated higher in the hierarchy of norms than RTA rules, it cannot be
overruled simply because of an RTA obligation.
In sum, under the current WTO legal framework, RTA rules can be
applied only under limited circumstances, just as there may be practical or
doctrinal limits to what may be brought under WTO dispute settlement.
New thinking is needed if we want the WTO dispute settlement system to
apply the RTA rules and generate a body of ‘common law’ for RTAs—what
we might tentatively call the ‘public international law of trade.’
In this regard, we think it would be worthwhile as a practical matter to
make the WTO at least an optional forum for the RTA parties so that the
WTO could contribute to the development of such a body of ‘common law’,
and that in this way, under the stewardship of the Appellate Body, the law
will in time work itself pure.83 But if the WTO were to serve such a function,
the current DSU may require amendment so that the jurisdiction of the
WTO Panel and Appellate Body would not be limited, at least in some
cases, to ‘covered agreements’. Alternatively, even if they would not be lim-
ited in all cases, amendment would provide much needed certainty and
clarity. Coupled with the jurisdictional problem discussed earlier, DSU
Article 23.2.(a) may yet be taken to mean that WTO Members have no
recourse but to submit to WTO dispute settlement where there is a question
involving the violation of a WTO covered agreement obligation.
V. ‘FARMING OUT’ THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE FOR
RTA DISPUTES: THE ‘BEST FORUM’ ARGUMENT
The idea that there are multiple options to the compulsory settlement of
international disputes is hardly novel.
The traditional difficulty with subjecting diplomatic dispute over various
subjects to compulsory dispute settlement was the principle of sovereign
choice. Sovereigns choose how they have their disputes resolved. But one
option that was revived from antiquity during the nineteenth century is
international arbitration. The commission established under the 1794 Jay
Treaty was one such example,84 and arbitration was given renewed impetus
83 ‘[A]nd adapts itself to the needs of a new day’. The phrase is Lord Mansfield’s. Cited in
Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (Chicago: Foundation Press 1940) 140.
84 Opened for signature 19 November 1794, UK–US, 12 Bevans 13 (entered into force
24 June 1795).
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with the Alabama Claims (or ‘Geneva’) arbitration.85 The idea of compulsory
jurisdiction may be traced to this but at present has been muddled with the
idea of exclusive jurisdiction.
Exclusive compulsory dispute settlement is only a subset. That the WTO
dispute settlement procedure may provide for the compulsory settlement of
trade disputes today is nothing new. But does it mean that the WTO’s
jurisdiction is exclusive? The option of electing WTO dispute settlement in
some RTA provisions is only the latest manifestation of a far more estab-
lished doctrine; namely, that of the free choice of means of settling sovereign
disputes.86 Of course, the immediate retort to this is that DSU Article 23 is
meant to foreclose the doctrine of sovereign choice. Is that true?
Viewed carefully, the difficulty in the modern RTA context involves con-
flicts of jurisdiction, not a failure of compulsory dispute settlement. True, the
problem is particularly acute in light of the widespread appreciation post-
Uruguay Round that trade disputes would be semi-automatically submitted
to WTO dispute settlement. In other words, the problem arises because
RTAs threaten to undermine the WTO dispute settlement process. But
we have seen that unless an uncompromising stance is taken in the name
of WTO law, there is no clear prohibition of a future treaty prevailing
over an earlier treaty, at least in terms of international law doctrine. The
same applies in the case of a more specific treaty rule prevailing over a
general rule.
It might be thought that the practical problem arises because arbitrators
tasked with settling an RTA dispute might not recognize the WTO’s jurisdic-
tion as prevailing over their own. This has some legal justification in arbitra-
tion law. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz had been established for far
longer than it has been in WTO jurisprudence.87 Arbitrators are liable to fail
to comprehend why WTO dispute settlement should somehow constitute an
exception to a well-known arbitral doctrine. Put differently, if arbitrators can
rely on the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine against national courts, why would
they be precluded from doing so against WTO dispute settlement?
One neat solution may be to channel the actual handling of WTO disputes
to the WTO dispute settlement process itself. In cases where it is particularly
unclear whether a WTO or RTA rule controls the dispute, the idea of having
the choice of court process settled in advance of the choice of law issue
85 John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States
has been a Party (Washington: Government Printing Office 1898) vol. 1, 495–682.
86 See, e.g. C.L. Lim, ‘The Uses of Pacific Settlement Techniques in Malaysia-Singapore
Relations’, 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 313 (2005) (discussing the continued
salience of the sovereign choice doctrine amongst Southeast Asian nations).
87 A question arises concerning the extent to which an inter-party dispute in a modern FTA (as
opposed, for example, to an investor-state dispute) may be said to result in an arbitral award,
and more to the point is to be considered ‘arbitration’ in the first place. It might be argued
that they are no more ‘arbitration’ than the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
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seems particularly attractive. Practical wisdom might also suggest that if you
put the issue before the right ‘forum’, the ‘right’ choice of law would be
more likely to follow.88 In other words, some RTA disputes might best be
resolved by those persons who have some knowledge, familiarity, or profes-
sional credibility in applying WTO rules. This would also ensure the harmo-
nization of rules, particularly those rules dealing with WTO–RTA
jurisdictional conflicts.
The fundamental problem here seems to be this. Had parties really wished
to have all their trade disputes resolved at the WTO they would have said so.
So the question should ideally be taken back to be resolved in Geneva’s
multilateral setting. There are other advantages to a multilateral solution
in Geneva. Aside from the obvious psychological advantage in favour of a
multilateral solution, virtually all the active RTA-pursuing countries and
all WTO Members would be present. This allows the question of whether
a WTO-mandated solution should be preferred to be pursued but without
sacrificing bilateral consultations between WTO Members.
To help the WTO carry out this task, we suggest the following as a pos-
sible starting point for deeper reflection on the issues.
(1) The DSU should be amended to provide the possibility for RTA
Members to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve their RTA
disputes. To provide the legal basis for this, Members to an RTA should
insert the following clause on dispute settlement in their RTAs:
The Parties agree to refer all relevant disputes under this agreement to the WTO
dispute settlement body. The WTO dispute settlement body shall have
the exclusive competence to decide whether a dispute constitutes a relevant dispute
for the purposes of the present provision. A ruling on a relevant dispute by the
WTO dispute settlement body shall be considered binding before any arbitral or
other dispute settlement body or procedure established pursuant to the present
Agreement.
Correspondingly, Appendix 1 of the DSU could be amended to include the
following:
(D) Regional Trade Agreements
The applicability of this Understanding to the Regional Trade Agreements
of Members (‘the individual agreement’) shall be subject to the adoption of
a decision by the parties to the individual agreement setting out the terms
for the application of this Understanding to such agreements, including any
special or additional rules or procedures for inclusion in Appendix 2, as notified
to the DSB.
88 For the theoretical argument, see Adrian Briggs, ‘Conflict of Laws: Postponing the Future?’,
9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 251 (1989), at 253 ff.
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(2) In order to facilitate the adjudication of RTA disputes by the Panel or
AB, any RTA which adopts the WTO dispute settlement system should also
grant the Panel and Appellate Body the powers to decide on the following
two issues: first, whether the RTA fully complies with the requirements
under GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V. To the extent that an RTA
cannot be justified, the Members will not be allowed to invoke the RTA as a
defense against non-compliance of their relevant WTO obligations. Second,
whether or not the RTA affects the interests of non-Members. To the extent
that it does, such non-Member shall be given the opportunity to join in the
dispute as well.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
One last question has to do with what kind of institutional framework we
might adopt for the adjudication of RTA disputes at the WTO. Should the
normal rules for the constitution and operation of WTO Panels be retained,
or should we instead adopt the institutional framework under individual
RTAs? In other words, should it be more akin to ad hoc arbitration or the
kind of institutional arbitration which simply resorts to institutional arbitra-
tion rules for the convenience they might afford?89 What, in other words,
should be the lex arbitri?90 In our view, to maintain the integrity of the WTO
dispute settlement system, the current procedural rules and practices under
the DSU should be adopted to the furthest extent possible, while providing
the possibility for the Panel to adopt different procedures. If so, a further
clause should also be inserted into the RTA stating this. With regard to the
specific procedural issues, our suggestions are as follows.
(1) Parties to the dispute: generally speaking, only parties to a specific
dispute can be parties of a case. In cases involving substantive rules
in the RTA which affect all Members of the RTA, the other RTA
Members which are not parties to the dispute should have the right
to join in the dispute settlement proceeding. Even in cases which
involve only the substantive rights of the parties to the particular
dispute, non-party Members can join as third parties if the main
parties to the dispute agree. In cases involving the substantive
rights of non-RTA Members, such non-RTA Members should also
have the right to join in the dispute settlement proceeding. Even in
cases which involve only the substantive rights of RTA Members,
non-RTA Members can join as third parties if all the Members of
the RTA agree. Such an arrangement will ensure that the interests
89 See further, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter et al., Law and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration (4th edn, London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2004), paras 1.99 ff.
90 Ibid, paras 2.08–2.11. For the distinction between the arbitration rules and the lex arbitri (the
law governing the arbitration), see ibid, paras 2.12–2.13.
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of all parties, RTA Members and non-Members alike, are adequately
represented in such dispute settlement proceedings. This will not
only ensure the highest degree of support among all parties who
might have an interest in such cases, but also the highest degree of
uniformity between different cases as well.
(2) Composition of the Panel: while we recognize that Panelists should
have a sufficient understanding of the particular issues facing the
Members of an RTA, we also believe that, as RTAs are only tolerated
in the multilateral trading system because they are perceived as
‘building blocks’ which contribute to the ultimate goal of global
trade liberalization through the gradual expansion of regional eco-
nomic integration, the idiosyncrasies in particular RTAs should not
be used as an excuse to upset the carefully negotiated balance of
rights and obligations in the WTO as a whole. Therefore, of the
three Panelists to each Panel, at least one should be someone who
is not chosen by one of the RTA parties. This should be a person of
recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, interna-
tional trade, and the subject matter of the covered agreements gen-
erally. The other two would be nominated, respectively, by the two
principal parties to the dispute. In case of disagreement among the
two Panelists nominated by the RTA Members, the ruling of the
third Panelist shall prevail. Such arrangement is intended to ensure
not only that the Panel has the necessary expertise to solve the dis-
pute at hand, but also consistency with WTO jurisprudence would
be maintained.
(3) Generally, the proceedings of the Panel may be kept confidential
and limited only to the disputing parties. If all the parties to the
dispute agree, however, or if the RTA whose provisions are called
into question provides expressly for public hearings, then the pro-
ceedings may be open to the general public. The reports of the
Panel should however be generally made available to WTO Mem-
bers, so that such reports can gradually build up a body of ‘common
law’ on RTA.
(4) The meetings of the Panel may be held either in Geneva or at
another mutually agreed location, such as in the territory of an
RTA Member or in a third country. To the extent possible, both
the WTO Secretariat and the secretariat for the RTA shall provide
the necessary legal and administrative support to the Panel.
(5) While the particular findings and recommendations of the Panel in a
particular dispute shall only be binding upon the parties to the dis-
pute, the analysis by the Panel on substantive rules in an RTA should
ideally also apply to future cases between Members of the same RTA,
while the analysis by the Panel of general WTO provisions shall also
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be of persuasive value for future disputes involving similar provisions
between the Members of other RTAs.
(6) If a party to a dispute is not satisfied with the ruling of the Panel, it
shall have a right to appeal the report to the Appellate Body.
(7) To avoid the diversion of resources from the current responsibilities
and functions of WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, the expenses
for a case from an RTA should be funded by the RTA Members
involved in such dispute. Special and differential treatment could
be provided to RTA Members which are developing countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have discussed the possibility of using the WTO dispute
settlement system as a common good for RTA disputes. In answering this
question, we have separated the doctrinal analysis from our recommenda-
tions for reform, i.e. what could be done to use the WTO dispute settlement
system as a common good for RTA disputes under the WTO legal frame-
work as it stands, versus how the current WTO legal framework should be
changed to make it more useful. While we believe that it is desirable to use
the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve RTA disputes, we also believe
that there are significant uncertainties under the current WTO legal frame-
work. Ideally, that framework should be amended. By confronting the con-
flict between the current WTO dispute settlement rules and RTA disputes in
a direct manner, we have avoided the temptation to twist the current rules to
achieve the result we want. In our view, such shortcuts create false hope for
those who believe that the WTO dispute settlement system has a role to play
in RTA disputes. It also threatens the integrity and legitimacy of the WTO
dispute settlement system as a whole by trying to feed it with something
which it cannot readily digest, resulting in congestion and possibly a great
combustion of the WTO dispute settlement system.
While we recommend that a new treaty rule should be undertaken on a
plurilateral basis, WTO Members which might encounter difficulty in signing
on to the new regime should nonetheless be allowed to bring their RTA
conflicts to WTO dispute settlement by way of special agreement instead.
This additional flexibility has in any case proven extremely useful in the
context of disputes before the ICJ.91
91 For persuasive arguments in favour of the special agreement procedure in the context of the
International Court of Justice, see e.g. Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr, ‘The ICJ and
Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause’, 81 American Journal of
International Law 57 (1987), generally.
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